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1 Introduction 
According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular 
meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat 
as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.
1
 Such a theory of 
meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression 
possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other 
expressions. 
 
It is widely recognised that this holism leads to two prima facie problems for IRS. 
First, since no two speakers share the same beliefs, they will inevitably be disposed to 
make, or treat as correct, different inferential transitions involving an expression. 
Hence, according to IRS, the same word in different mouths will possess a different 
meaning and be understood in different ways. It seems to follow that communication 
is impossible. Second, and relatedly, since a particular speaker’s beliefs are constantly 
changing, at different times she will inevitably be disposed to make, or treat as 
correct, different inferential transitions involving an expression. Hence, according to 
IRS, the same word in the same mouth will possess a different meaning and be 
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understood differently at different times. It seems to follow that constancy of meaning 
is impossible. In this paper, I shall focus only on the former problem of 
communication, although much of what I say will bear on the latter problem of 
constancy. 
 
Proponents and detractors of IRS alike typically hold that the way to avoid this is to 
introduce a distinction in kind between those inferential transitions that are 
determinative of the meaning of an expression and those that are not, i.e. an 
analytic/synthetic distinction (see Boghossian, 1993; 1994; 1997; Fodor and Lepore, 
1991; 1992; Horwich, 1992; 1998; 2005, 38-9; Lepore, 1994; Peacocke, 1992).
2
 Each 
party differs only on the issue of whether such a distinction can or should be drawn. 
 
In contrast, Brandom seeks to resolve the communication problem facing IRS without 
drawing an analytic/synthetic distinction. In his own words, Brandom refuses to adopt 
such an ‘inegalitarian attitude toward the different inferences a concept is involved in’ 
(MIE, 634; cf. 484, 587). His egalitarian and novel alternative, which I shall examine 
in this paper, is to appeal to the nature of de re ascriptions.
3
 
 
In what follows, I shall take for granted, with Brandom and those authors referenced 
above, that the communication problem poses a genuine difficulty for IRS and so calls 
for some kind of response (cp. Block, 1995; Harman, 1993). I shall begin by outlining 
the details of Brandom’s particular version of IRS and register his recognition of the 
communication problem (§2). Next, I shall outline the apparatus he introduces in 
order to resolve that problem, namely that of de re ascription (§3). Having done so, I 
shall argue that Brandom’s alternative to the traditional appeal to analyticity fails in 
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several respects to provide a genuine explanation of shareable meaning and mutual 
understanding (§4). 
 
In a number of places, Brandom suggests that the mechanism of de re ascription 
introduces an externalism, according to which the meaning of an expression or the 
concept it expresses is determined by the linguistic practitioners’ physical 
environment. This, I shall claim, is either in tension with IRS or fails to provide a 
genuine account of shared meaning (§5).  
 
One might think that informing my objections to Brandom’s appeal to de re ascription 
is a suspect and demanding view of communication, one that can and should be 
challenged. After sketching that view on behalf of my opponent, I shall show that, 
irrespective of whether it is indeed suspect, the criticisms can be motivated 
independently of it (§6). Specifically, they apply equally by the standards of 
Brandom’s favoured model of communication.  
 
In closing, I recommend that one sympathetic to IRS – and in particular to the version 
that Brandom develops – accept the traditional response to the communication 
problem, namely that of drawing a distinction in kind between those inferential 
transitions that are determinative of meaning and those that are not (§7). Since at least 
Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951), many consider such an 
analytic/synthetic distinction to be obsolete. Although I am confident that a defensible 
notion of analyticity can be provided, and thus that IRS can avoid this particular 
problem, I shall leave that task for another occasion.
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2 Meaning holism and the communication problem 
Brandom recommends a version of IRS, according to which the content of a 
performance, and derivatively the meaning of an expression,
5
 is to be understood to 
consist in its being subject to inferential proprieties. This ‘semantically primitive 
notion of material proprieties of inference’ is in turn accounted for by a ‘normative 
pragmatics’ (MIE, 623).
6
 Ultimately, Brandom claims, for an assertion to express a 
given content, and so the sentence uttered to have a certain meaning, is for 
practitioners to treat it appropriately in practice as entitled or otherwise, and as 
committing practitioners to the propriety of further performances as a result. If one 
were to enumerate all the commitments and entitlements the utterance of any sentence 
involves, one would thereby capture what proposition is expressed, and so the 
meaning of the sentence used. The ability to understand a language (‘scorekeeping’) 
is the practical capacity to keep track of these commitments and entitlements (the 
‘score’) (see MIE, chs. 2-3).
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Brandom notes that such a story is committed to holism about meaning (AR, 15-6; 
MIE, 89-91). If contents are individuated by the inferential relations they stand in to 
other contents or, in scorekeeping terms, if the significance of a performance is taken 
to consist in its relation to other performances, then it follows that there cannot be one 
content or significance without others. I consider this innocuous. However, the degree 
of holism that Brandom is prepared to countenance is greater (and more problematic) 
than this. Brandom commits himself to a global holism, according to which the 
content of a performance (or meaning of an expression) is determined by all the 
inferential relations it stands in. 
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In a number of places, Brandom notes a potential difficulty for IRS that stems from 
global holism, namely the communication problem. He observes that such holism 
‘seems to threaten the intelligibility of mutual understanding and so of successful 
communication’ (MIE, 587-8).
8
 The problem occurs because 
what else a commitment with a particular content commits one to […] depends on its 
deontic context, on what concomitant commitments are available as auxiliary 
hypotheses or collateral premises. (MIE, 504)
9 
In view of our different beliefs, or in scorekeeping terms our different practical 
attitudes, the commitments I take the utterance of a given expression to involve will 
differ from those you take it to involve. So, if the semantic content expressed by an 
utterance (or derivatively the meaning of the tokened expression) is to be explained in 
terms of the normative status that it possesses, it would seem that that content (or 
meaning) differs according to one’s own commitments. Brandom summarises the 
problem as follows: 
We each embody different perceptual and practical perspectives and so will never 
have exactly the same commitments […] As long as there are differences in the 
collateral set of commitments with respect to which the content of the claim 
expressed by a sentence needs to be assessed, the sentence in one mouth means 
something different from what that same sentence means in another mouth. (MIE, 
509-10; cf. 475, 587)
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This appears to result in a kind of quasi-Cartesian privacy about meaning. If 
‘inferential significance is not preserved in communication’ (MIE, 480), then mutual 
understanding is not possible. Imagine, for example, that Sophie utters: 
(1) The car is parked in the garage. 
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Given our different beliefs, Sophie takes the utterance of such words to have a very 
different inferential significance than I do. She would not infer to, ‘The vehicle that 
ran over the cat is parked in the garage’. It follows, given IRS and global holism, that 
we understand the words and what is expressed by their use differently. Hence, 
communication is impossible. 
 
One might wonder whether Brandom’s IRS requires that shared understanding be 
possible. Perhaps communication requires only sufficiently similar understanding. 
The problem with a suggestion of this kind, as Fodor and Lepore point out (1992, 17-
22), is that it simply assumes shared concepts (or mutual understanding of the 
corresponding expressions). Consider how one might ascertain similarity. Presumably 
one would need to enumerate the various inferences that any two speakers are 
prepared to treat as proper. Their understanding is similar just in so far as they are 
prepared to make a sufficient number of the same inferences. But what is to count as 
the same inference? Surely those that contain identical concepts. Clearly, then, this 
strategy presupposes rather than explains the fact that speakers possess identical 
concepts (or have the same understanding of the corresponding expressions). 
 
A seemingly obvious solution to the communication problem would be to draw a line 
between those inferential relations that are determinative of an expression’s meaning, 
or correlatively essential to understanding what is expressed by its utterance, and 
those that are not, traditionally labelled the analytic/synthetic distinction. But, as 
quoted above, Brandom rejects this strategy (for familiar Quinean reasons). In the 
next section, I shall outline his alternative explanation of the possibility of 
  7 
communication. (No doubt there are other possible strategies for resolving the 
difficulty, but the focus of this paper is Brandom’s proposal.) 
 
3 De dicto and de re ascription 
Brandom aims to show that, on his theory, it is the specification or expression of 
content that is perspectival, not the content itself. To deal with the difficulties global 
holism raises, Brandom appeals to the role of ascriptional locutions, such as ‘claims’, 
understood in the terms of his version of IRS.
11
 I shall outline how that appeal is 
supposed to meet those problems. (This section is wholly exegetical; critical 
assessment is reserved until later.) 
 
Ascriptional locutions are used to specify the content of another’s claim. For example, 
given Sophie’s utterance of (1), I might utter: 
(2) Sophie claims that the car is parked in the garage. 
In the vocabulary Brandom employs, such an ascription makes explicit one’s own 
practical attitude of attributing a normative status. That is, the content one ascribes is 
supposed to capture the normative significance one takes the utterance to have. In 
making an ascription, one attributes a commitment to the target while simultaneously 
undertaking a different commitment oneself, namely to a claim about what someone 
else claims. 
 
It seems, however, that there is a difficulty for the use of such locutions, resulting 
from the holism outlined above. Expressions occurring within an ascription must play 
a dual role; they must express both the attributed commitments and the commitments 
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thereby undertaken by the ascriber. Hence the familiar problem of differences in 
inferential profiles arises in the special case of ascribing claims: 
the occurrence of an expression [within an ascription] might have one inferential 
significance if evaluated with respect to the collateral commitments of the one to 
whom the commitment is attributed, and might have quite another if evaluated with 
respect to the collateral commitments of the one who undertakes the ascriptional 
commitment. (MIE, 504)
12
 
It appears, then, that any given speaker will be unable to make a successful ascription. 
Consider again (2). Sophie takes the utterance of such words to have a very different 
inferential significance than I do. Unlike me, she does not believe that the vehicle that 
ran over the cat is parked in the garage. So I have not specified what she claims as she 
understands it. But I cannot specify her claim as she sees it, since my perspective 
differs from Sophie’s. It follows, given IRS and global holism, that mutual 
comprehension is impossible. 
 
The problem facing explicit ascriptions is a vivid case of that facing attributions of 
semantic content generally. Note, however, that an ascription of the above sort is of 
the de dicto form. What is distinctive of the de dicto style of ascription, according to 
Brandom, is that 
the ascriber […] is committed to the target being prepared to acknowledge the 
attributed commitment in essentially the terms specified – that is, to endorse the 
dictum. (AR, 175; cf. MIE, 500-8)
13
 
Brandom’s proposal to the problem of communication is to look not to de dicto but to 
de re ascriptions. 
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In order to make a successful ascription, Brandom suggests, the ascriber must be able 
to substitute the target’s words for terms that in her mouth express the same claim: 
if you want to understand what I say, you have to be able to associate with it a 
sentence that in your mouth expresses the same claim as the sentence uttered in mine. 
(MIE, 509-10)
14
 
This capacity to substitute expressions with the same inferential relations allows one 
‘to accommodate differences in discursive perspective, to navigate across them’ (MIE 
p.588). Of course, substitution involves specifying the content in a way that the target 
of the ascription might not be prepared or in a position to acknowledge. For example, 
Sophie would not assent to: 
(3) Sophie claims that the vehicle that ran over the cat is parked in the 
garage. 
It is this difference in perspective that is marked by the use of de re locutions, which 
ascribe commitments one takes a target to have without committing oneself to the 
target acknowledging the commitments so specified. For example: 
(4) Sophie claims, of the vehicle that ran over the cat, that it is parked in 
the garage. 
I am thus (supposedly) able to specify her claim in my own terms, with no suggestion 
that she sees it the same way: 
The part of the content specification that appears within the scope of the de re ‘of’ 
clause includes what, according to the ascriber of the commitment but not necessarily 
according to the one to whom it is ascribed, is acknowledged as an expression of 
what the target of the ascription is committed to. (MIE, 505-6) 
 
So, although the inferential significance of an expression varies according to one’s 
doxastic perspective, one can nonetheless ascribe a claim to another by distinguishing 
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that part of the ascription that the target would acknowledge as an expression of her 
commitments and that part that the target is committed to irrespective of her 
attitudes.
15
 The latter corresponds to the part of the specification that draws on the 
ascriber’s idiosyncratic commitments, and the former to the part that restricts itself to 
shared commitments: 
Where the specification of the content depends only on auxiliary premises that […] 
the target of the ascription acknowledges being committed to, it is put in de dicto 
position […] Where the specification of the content depends on auxiliary premises 
that the ascriber endorses, but the target of the ascription may not, it is put in de re 
position. (MIE, 506; cf. AR, 177-8) 
Mutual understanding, Brandom proposes, depends on this ability to navigate between 
one’s own perspective and that of one’s interlocutor, to explicitly specify or implicitly 
attribute commitment to contents de re. As he unequivocally states, ‘what is expressed 
by de re specification of the contents of the beliefs of others is crucial to 
communication’ (AR, 180, my underlining).
16
 
 
This appeal to de re ascriptions is intended to meet the communication problem that 
seems to afflict IRS due to global holism. Brandom is, however, far from clear as to 
how exactly. What follows is an attempt at reconstruction. Since the apparatus of 
substitution and de re ascriptions make the shared subject-matter of the discourse 
explicit – by specifying what is being talked about, rather than how it is talked about 
(MIE, 502-3) – then it (supposedly) secures or anchors communication across 
perspectives. 
 
Furthermore, insofar as the apparatus of substitution enables one to specify the 
significance of another’s claim, it shows that one can (in principle) grasp that 
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significance. And there will be a practical attitude – one of implicitly attributing 
content – underlying the explicit use of ascriptional locutions. Thus, Brandom 
contends, genuine understanding of another’s performance (and so words) is possible. 
In this way, one purportedly arrives at a conception of non-perspectival content, and 
so of meaning. If understanding is shareable, presumably that which is understood is 
shareable. Although the specification of the content differs from the target’s own, it is 
nonetheless ‘the very same claim’. Its content consists, not in the inferential 
significance any given interlocutor attaches to the expression, but ‘in the systematic 
relations among the various pragmatic significances’; it is a kind of point on the 
‘coordinated system of scorekeeping perspectives’ (MIE, 590-1). 
 
It is important to note that, for Brandom, de re ascriptions mark a distinction between 
what a performer acknowledges being committed to and what the ascriber considers 
her to be actually, as a matter of fact, committed to (irrespective of her attitudes) 
(MIE, 596-7). So, it is the objective proprieties, what a given performance really 
commits a practitioner to as opposed to what she takes herself to be, a distinction built 
into scorekeeping, that confers an objective content on a performance and so a 
shareable meaning on the corresponding expressions (MIE, 631). This, Brandom 
states, amounts to a semantic externalism according to which ‘what we mean depends 
on how things actually are, whether we know how they are or not’ (MIE, 647). Of 
course, an ability to understand what is expressed, and to intentionally produce 
sentences with the relevant meaning, requires one be a scorekeeping practitioner. But 
what is thereby expressed is determined by the non-linguistic environment, as 
emerges from the differing perspectives scorekeepers have on the significance of their 
words.  
  12 
 
In this way, Brandom’s scorekeeping account of de re ascriptions, and the 
corresponding implicit practical attitude, is intended to resolve the problems raised by 
the global holism that he countenances. Social interaction, a feature of scorekeeping 
practice, supposedly provides the resources for a conception of mutual understanding, 
and thereby of communicable content or meaning. 
 
4 Criticisms of Brandom’s apparatus 
In this section, I shall question whether Brandom’s response to the communication 
problem facing IRS as a result global holism – i.e. his appeal to the mechanism made 
explicit by de re locutions – is successful.
17
 There are, I shall argue, a number of 
problems that demonstrate, either cumulatively or individually, that it is not.
18
 
 
4.1 Substitution 
On Brandom’s account, de re ascriptions involve substitution. An example he offers is 
that of replacing a Zoroastrian’s use of the expression ‘the seventh god’, in an 
utterance of ‘The seventh god has risen’, with the expression ‘the sun’. Such a 
substitution would supposedly enable one to place her remark in an inferential 
context. 
 
First, however, the ability to so substitute the expression surely presupposes that one 
antecendently understands what the Zoroastrian is saying, or what her words mean; 
otherwise it is not clear how one could determine the appropriate substitution. That is 
to say, according to Brandom, genuine understanding of another’s claim, despite 
divergent beliefs, is possible because one can ascribe or attribute a claim from a 
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perspective external to the subject’s. This is done via substitution. From oratio recta, 
or direct quotation, one supposedly moves to oratio obliqua, or indirect speech, in the 
de re style by replacing a speaker’s words with one’s own and using them to specify 
her claim (or commitments). However, surely what determines the correct 
substitution, and hence the correct de re ascription, is what the subject is saying, or 
what her words mean. Substitution depends on prior mutual understanding, and 
therefore cannot explain it.  
 
If substitution does not require an independent grasp of what is said, it requires 
identifying a reference-fixing belief or claim concerning the target. In Sophie’s case, 
this would be something like, ‘The car is the blue vehicle with a rusty door’. But any 
such claim itself stands in a different inferential context for Sophie than the one I take 
it to stand in, and so the problem of mutual understanding is only pushed back a stage 
and a vicious regress looms. 
 
Brandom might try and avoid these problems by denying that the de dicto 
characterisation is cognitively or epistemologically primary, i.e. not the result of an 
inference but the object of immediate response (although his talk of substitution and 
navigation clearly suggests it is). However the onus is then on Brandom to explain 
how the de re conception of what is said can be immediately and non-inferentially 
accessible, or available in advance of the de dicto (i.e. how one can get to the res 
without passing through the dictum). 
 
4.2 Anaphora 
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One might complain that I have so far neglected Brandom’s appeal to anaphora, 
which simply side-steps the above objections. Brandom clearly states that 
‘Interpersonal anaphora plays an important role in securing the possibility of 
communication’ (MIE, 474). However, while it is true that anaphora plays a central 
part in Brandom’s account of de re ascription and has so far been ignored, attending 
to it only reveals the inadequacies in that account as a solution to the problem of 
communication. 
 
In the terms of Brandom’s IRS, anaphora is ‘the inheritance by one tokening [of an 
expression] from another of the structure that determines which substitutional 
commitments are relevant to its semantic assessment’ (MIE, 473). For example, if 
Beryl utters ‘Jones lied in court’, I might respond ‘He sounds untrustworthy’. Beryl 
and I can take both utterances to be about the same individual, even if I know nothing 
else about that individual, insofar as we treat my utterance of ‘he’ to be anaphorically 
dependent on Beryl’s utterance of ‘Jones’. In virtue of being so dependent, my 
utterance of ‘he’ inherits the inferential substitution commitments to which ‘Jones’ is 
subject. 
 
Crucially, an anaphorically dependent expression is simply stipulated to be subject to 
the same proprieties of inferential substitution as its antecedent, and hence a speaker 
does not need to ‘work out’ what the correct substitution is (MIE, 486). Thus, if two 
uses of an expression can be anaphorically linked (in virtue of the attitudes of 
speakers) then the mechanism of substitution does not suffer from the above 
difficulties. 
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Granting that anaphoric links can be established in this way, the important question is 
whether this affords a genuine explanation of communication, of one speaker 
understanding what is said by another speaker. Accordingly, consider Brandom’s talk 
of anaphora enabling the ‘inheritance’ of inferential substitution commitments. If ‘to 
inherit’ means to come to grasp the very same inferential substitution commitments 
governing an expression as those grasped by one’s interlocutor, anaphora does not 
really allow one to inherit anything at all in this sense. As Brandom himself remarks: 
the substitutional commitments to be inherited anaphorically by one token from 
another are assessed by the scorekeeper who attributes the anaphoric commitment. 
(MIE, 487) 
Anaphora alone does not enable me to know what expressions Beryl, rather than 
myself, would treat as intersubstitutable for ‘Jones’, or Sophie for ‘the car’, or the 
Zoroastrian for ‘the seventh god’. Hence, it does not enable me to know what each 
person is saying, what proposition her utterance expresses. Anaphora might link 
inferential profiles in the sense of merely associating them, but not in the sense of 
permitting the sharing or accessing of them. Thus, although it provides a means of 
substitution that does not presuppose antecedent grasp of meaning, precisely for that 
reason anaphora, as analysed in the terms of Brandom’s IRS, does not make possible 
communication. 
 
4.3 The de dicto component 
Even if one grants the intelligibility and success of the substitution strategy, it is still 
the case that de re ascriptions involve a de dicto component. Consider again: 
(4) Sophie claims, of the vehicle that ran over the cat, that it is parked in 
the garage. 
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Given my different perspective, I take ‘parked’ and ‘garage’ – which fall within the 
scope of the de dicto locution – to stand in different inferential contexts than Sophie. 
She would not infer, for example, from ‘That is the garage’ to ‘That is where the 
bicycle was stolen’. Hence, there is not really any part of the ascription that both 
parties can grasp as a specification of the original claim. 
 
Note that, for Brandom, the de dicto specification is restricted to what, according to 
the ascriber, the target would acknowledge as an expression of her claim. But this is 
clearly not, by the lights of global holism, a sufficient condition for successful 
ascription. Even if Sophie, having uttered ‘…is parked in the garage’, assents to the 
specification contained in the that-clause of (4), the expressions therein nonetheless 
have a different inferential significance for her than for me. Hence, despite 
appearances, mutual assent is not a criterion of mutual comprehension. 
 
So it seems that the issue of how the claim is ascribed is not to the point; it is rather 
what else a subject is committed to. Brandom’s focus on what terms are used to 
express commitments elides the problem of mutual understanding rather than 
addresses it. But even if one considers the matter only in terms of attributions that 
distinguish between those commitments, however they are specified, that the target 
takes herself to have and those that the ascriber takes her as a matter of fact to 
undertake, equivalent difficulties remain. The problem is simply that, given global 
holism, there are no commitments that I could attribute and that my interlocutor 
considers herself to have, since commitments are always inferentially articulated and 
our inferential profiles always differ.  
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It appears that in order properly to avoid the problems global holism raises for IRS, 
the relevant attribution would have to be wholly de re. Thus, for Brandom, a felicitous 
ascription of Sophie’s claim would be: 
(5) Sophie claims, of the vehicle that ran over the cat parked in the garage, 
that. 
First, however, this is hardly grammatical. Second, in the absence of anything 
expressed by a that-clause, one loses any sense in which a claim is being ascribed. 
One is left with a mere demonstration. As a general model of communication, of how 
speakers interpret one another’s words, this ought to be unpalatable enough to make 
one reconsider the steps that led to it. But, even if one were prepared to bite the bullet, 
the model fails.
19
 
 
Presumably one would have to hold that, in an ascription such as (5), the second ‘that’ 
is functioning as a demonstrative, which picks out the car’s being parked in the 
garage. On this account, the utterance as a whole claims of a demonstrated state of 
affairs that the target is committed to its obtaining. However, this could only work for 
true claims, or rather for claims the ascriber takes to be true. If I do not believe, for 
example, that the car is in the garage, I could not take myself to be demonstrating it. 
Perhaps one could avoid this problem by ascribing the claim as follows: 
(6) Sophie claims, of the vehicle that ran over the cat and of being parked 
and of the garage, that. 
However, one has now lost the ‘unity’ of the content ascribed. In order for a genuine 
claim to be ascribed, one needs somehow to ‘order’ the parts. Doing so requires 
something to follow the ‘that’, but of course if something were added then the 
ascription would no longer be wholly de re. 
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Moreover, the significance of a tokened demonstrative too depends on one’s doxastic 
perspective, on what inferential substitutional commitments involving that expression 
one considers proper. Therefore, insofar as different practitioners will take the same 
tokening to involve different commitments, their understanding of it will differ. For 
example, Sophie would not infer from ‘That [car] is dented’ to ‘The vehicle that ran 
over the cat is dented’. Even if one restricts the attribution to a mere demonstration, 
then, mutual understanding of a claim is not possible, so long as global holism is in 
place.
20
 
 
4.4 Interpersonal significance 
Even if one ignores the above problems with the account of de re ascriptions, it 
remains the case that when a practitioner makes such ascriptions (or the 
corresponding implicit attribution) the perspectivism that Brandom’s holism enforces 
remains in place. Under substitution, the ascriber continues to take the specification to 
have a very different inferential significance than the target. Thus, given IRS, it 
follows that they understand it differently. In that case, Brandom must concede that 
no content is shared after all. In the Sophie example, even with the apparatus of 
substitution, I still place the performance in the inferential web I acknowledge, and 
Sophie still places it in the inferential web she acknowledges. And since, in virtue of 
our differing commitments, the significance we take the performance to have (and so 
the content we thereby implicitly or explicitly attribute to it) necessarily differs. 
 
What the de re apparatus provides, at best, is an explanation of how each subject 
attaches to a performance or expression the normative status she takes it to possess, 
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which surely falls short of an account of its possessing a shared significance. 
Crucially, note that there is no sense of the significance each person attaches to a 
word being suitably (or at all) responsive to the significance that others attach. Each 
person’s understanding has no bearing on that of her interlocutors. And even if some 
conception of interpersonal content were available – as what is common to all the 
different attributions of significance made to a given utterance of an expression – it 
would float entirely free of subjects’ attitudes, which would be utterly indifferent to it. 
Hence the problem of communication remains.
21
 
 
Brandom seems to have lost hold on any notion of communication, mutual 
understanding, and so shared meaning. It might be the case that two individuals can 
talk about the same thing – although it is far from clear that this is to be had in 
advance of the notion of talking per se – but still they cannot take themselves to be 
saying the same thing. Thus, Brandom’s appeal to de re locutions fails to provide an 
adequate account of semantic content. 
 
Not only is this an unfortunate result for his IRS, it is a surprising one given 
Brandom’s pragmatist orientation. An appeal to notions such as use or practice is 
typically presented as placing emphasis on the public nature of linguistic activity, as 
an insistence that understanding be manifest, as appropriately situating the notion of 
meaning in its characteristic context of communication, and more generally as 
dissuading us from a Cartesian conception of subjects as essentially cut off from one 
another in private realms. Ironically, Brandom’s actual description of scorekeeping 
practice, and the attitudes it incorporates, enforces precisely that conception. 
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So, the problem is that for Brandom there is no sense in which mutual understanding 
is possible at all, since there is no constant (an invariant meaning) between speakers, 
and so nothing to anchor communication. Given that interlocutors with different 
beliefs take expressions and performances to stand in different inferential contexts, 
there is no respect in which they can take those expressions in the same way, or treat 
one another’s performances as possessing the same significance. The introduction of 
de re locutions was supposed to meet this difficulty, but the suggestion is that it fails 
to do so. 
 
5 Externalism 
Brandom might charge the above criticisms with overlooking the semantic 
externalism that he advocates. On his view, the content of a claim, and derivatively 
the meaning of the corresponding expression, is determined by objective inferential 
relations, that is, relations that correspond not to any perspective but to ‘how the 
world is’. Thus, there is an independent, shareable content, of which all practitioners 
can have firmer or looser grasps. What performances are proper or improper is a 
matter of how things stand in the world (MIE, 632), though of course one must be a 
scorekeeping practitioner to appreciate this. While this variant of externalism would 
perhaps solve the communication problem, it in turn introduces a number of 
(increasingly severe) problems.
22
 
 
If semantic content or meaning consists solely in objective relations between the 
relevant features of the world, one loses any link between the ‘co-ordinate’ (MIE, 73) 
concepts of meaning and understanding. That is, one cannot account for the cognitive 
difference in co-extensive terms or, rather, the inferential relations between them. For 
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example, objectively-speaking, the inferences from ‘That is a creature with a heart’ to 
‘That is a cordate’, and from ‘That is a creature with a heart’ to ‘That is a renate’, are 
correct in just the same instances. Thus, on the account being considered here, the 
terms ‘cordate’ and ‘renate’ have the same meaning, or express the same content. 
However, they are surely understood differently; they have a different cognitive 
significance (shown by the fact that one could coherently take opposing psychological 
attitudes towards the two inferences). Since Brandom (for good reason) does not wish 
to divorce understanding and meaning, he cannot endorse this account. Introducing a 
notion such as meaning or sense to supplement that of reference is intended to account 
for the cognitive significance of what is said (see Frege, 1892). For Brandom to revert 
back to reference at the expense of such content is precisely to relinquish meaning.
23
 
 
Moreover, in dropping meaning, or a fine-grained individuation of content, in favour 
of a coarse-grained individuation of content, one would lose a central motivation for 
pursuing IRS. Insofar as IRS explains the meaning of an expression, or the concept it 
expresses, in terms of its role in reasoning, it captures the cognitive significance of an 
expression and thereby avoids the familiar Frege-problems (see Lepore 1994, 193). 
My aim here is not to defend Fregeanism, or even IRS, but only to note that prima 
facie the latter is committed to the former. 
 
In any case, Brandom cannot avail himself of the appeal to externalism so construed, 
since (taken literally) semantic externalism would commit him to a view according to 
which proprieties of inference are in force, and so contents or meanings in place, in 
isolation from any practice or practitioner. This is clearly antithetical to IRS. Instead, 
Brandom must restrict himself to the inferential role being determined by how 
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practitioners take things to be. But in this case, one is back to the problem of mutual 
understanding and so shared meaning.
24
 
 
So, it seems that Brandom’s semantic externalism provides no obvious resolution of 
the problems associated with holism. The brand of externalism he outlines threatens 
to distance semantic, intensional notions from the actual activities and perspectives of 
linguistic practitioners. But the ‘internalist’ construal, according to which speakers’ 
attitudes and resultant use of an expression alone are determinative of content, 
remains untenable so long as one endorses global holism. 
 
In fact, on closer inspection, Brandom’s version of IRS does not anyway appear to 
provide a genuine externalism. According to it, the meaning of an expression or the 
content it expresses is determined by how things objectively are according to the one 
ascribing or attributing that meaning or content. It is, then, still the case that, on 
Brandom’s theory, meaning is determined in the first instance by the attitudes of each 
speaker, not by extra-linguistic reality. Indeed, this is evident from careful attention to 
Brandom’s actual formulations. On his view, the correct use of an expression (and 
thereby its meaning) is not determined, as he often suggests, by objective matters 
‘transcending the attitudes of practitioners’ (AR, 198), but rather by ‘how things 
objectively… are taken to be’ (MIE, 498, my underlining; cf. AR, 183). Hence, this 
aspect of Brandom’s IRS does not really provide a determinate of meaning that is 
unaffected by differences in inferential profiles, and so does not circumvent the 
communication problem. 
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6 Models of communication 
It has been put to me by those sympathetic to Brandom on this issue that the above 
criticisms take for granted a conception of successful communication that Brandom 
rejects. Call it ‘the conveyance model’. According to that model, successful 
communication involves ‘sharing a relation to one and the same thing’ (MIE, 479), 
‘the joint possession of some common thing’ (MIE, 485). On this account, there is an 
entity – a meaning – that is transported from a speaker to an audience via a suitable 
vehicle (the tokening of an expression). Now, Brandom might grant that his version of 
IRS, and the ability made explicit by de re ascriptions that it incorporates, is 
incompatible with the conveyance model but insist that such a model is in any event 
to be abandoned. 
 
Importantly, no grounds have as yet been offered for agreeing that the conveyance 
model, which Brandom admits is ‘natural’ and ‘commsensical’ (MIE, 479), is 
nevertheless objectionable. And such grounds surely cannot be simply that it does not 
accord with Brandom’s favoured theory of meaning. Hence, one might think that if 
the two conflict, so much the worse for his version of IRS. However, irrespective of 
the status of the conveyance model, I hope to show that the appeal to de re ascription 
fails to explain how communication is possible, even granting Brandom’s own 
conception of communication. 
 
Notably, Brandom wants to hold on to the notions of ‘understanding, grasping a 
meaning – the cognitive uptake of communication’ (MIE, 485). Indeed, on his view, 
one can ‘strictly be said to understand what another says’, and contents can ‘genuinely 
be shared’ (MIE, 590).
25
 He is confident, however, that such phenomena are captured 
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by an alternative to the conveyance model. Call it ‘the cooperative model’. According 
to it, one should think of communication ‘in terms of cooperating in a joint activity’ 
(MIE, 479): 
The paradigm of communication as joint possession of some common thing is 
relinquished in favor of – or modified in the direction of – a paradigm of 
communication as a kind of cooperation in practice. (MIE, 485) 
In light of these remarks, and drawing upon the materials assembled in previous 
sections, I shall assess the extent to which Brandom’s theory is acceptable by the 
lights of the cooperative model. Before doing so, however, I shall consider how we 
are to understand communication or mutual understanding according to it.  
 
Importantly, it ought to be possible to outline the conveyance model independently of 
the details and terms of Brandom’s specific theory of meaning. This is necessary so 
that one can judge, first, whether the former is an independently attractive picture of 
communication and, second, whether Brandom’s own account does justice to it. 
Unfortunately, Brandom offers relatively little by way of such an autonomous 
characterisation of the model of communication he prefers, and for the most part we 
are left to understand it only according to the terms of this particular version of IRS. 
This makes it difficult to assess both the cooperative model’s own merits and the 
extent to which it differs from the conveyance model. As far as I can tell, the little 
Brandom offers is the following analogy: 
The participants [in conversation] do not need all to be doing the same thing (sharing) 
in a narrow sense in order to be engaged in a joint enterprise, and in that broader 
sense to be doing the same thing (sharing) […] Conversational partners should not be 
pictured as marching in step, like soldiers on parade, but more as ballroom dancers, 
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each making different movements […] and thereby sharing a dance that is constituted 
precisely by the coordination of their individually different movements. (2000b, 363) 
Without placing too much weight on a single simile, one can ask what picture of 
communication it suggests. Clearly, Brandom wishes to oppose the idea that 
successful communication requires that speakers perform and respond to 
performances in just the same way. Furthermore, the idea is surely not that there is 
some single thing – akin to a tune or rhythm in dance – with which both parties 
should be acquainted. This interpretation bears too much resemblance to the 
conveyance model. Presumably, the idea is rather that, while the participants’ moves 
(utterances, in the case of conversation) might be radically different, successful 
conversation requires that those moves be suitably responsive to one’s other moves 
and those of one’s partners, that the participants’ performances be coordinated. Thus, 
in the first instance, what those party to the conversation share is not a meaning as 
such but a mutual activity, from which the meaning subsequently emerges or in which 
it is thereby apparent. 
 
While somewhat speculative, this interpretation accords with Brandom’s own 
description of communication, given in the specific terms of his theory. On his 
account, successful communication requires not that speakers attribute ‘the same 
significance’ to a performance; it is rather a matter of ‘coordinating social 
perspectives by keeping deontic score according to common practices’ (MIE, 479). 
And, as we have seen, this ‘consists in auditors being able to move between their own 
doxastic perspective and that of the speaker in just the way expressed in de re 
ascriptions’ (MIE, 513). This in turn is supposedly made possible in the following 
way: 
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Anaphoric connections among tokenings that are utterances by different interlocutors 
provide a way of mapping their different repertoires of substitutional commitments 
onto one another. (MIE, 474-5) 
 
Considered apart from the actual details and terms of Brandom’s version of IRS, the 
cooperative model of communication appears unobjectionable. Of course, such a 
schematic picture needs to be fleshed out considerably but there is nothing obviously 
amiss in the idea that mutual understanding requires participants in a discussion to be 
suitably sensitive to one another’s performances, that it involves a kind of negotiation 
between the moves one considers proper and those that one’s partners consider proper 
and thus demands appropriate degrees of give and take. So, without taking a stand on 
the extent to which this picture competes with the conveyance model, it is time to ask 
to what extent Brandom’s account accords with it. I shall suggest that the objections 
made in the preceding sections are as effective by the lights of the cooperative model 
as those of its supposed rival. 
  
On the favoured model, successful communication requires practitioners to cooperate 
in a joint activity (or common practice) by coordinating their commitments and so 
performances. However, as argued above, the ‘interpretive’ ability possessed by a 
practitioner is only an ability to attach to a performance the significance she takes it to 
have, to connect it with and evaluate it according to her own repertoire of doxastic 
commitments. But surely this falls far short of an ability to cooperate by coordinating 
one’s commitments and moves with those of one’s interlocutors. If the arguments of 
the preceding sections are on target, practitioners are simply indifferent to one 
another’s performances. They are not, of course, insensitive to the brute fact that 
moves are being made, but cooperation (i.e. collaboration, working together) further 
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requires sensitivity to one’s interlocutors’ attitudes towards those moves (if not 
harmony with them). And the ability made explicit in de re ascriptions does not 
enable this. The problem is not that nothing is exchanged, as the conveyance model 
requires, but that participants are not suitably responsive to one another, as the 
cooperative model requires. And since there is no genuine cooperation, there is no 
practice that they can properly be said to be jointly participating in; they have nothing 
of relevance in common (beyond the sheer fact that both are undertaking various 
performances). Although there is activity of which each is a part, each is going her 
own way, so to speak. 
 
Brandom’s appeal to de re ascription fails, therefore, to solve the communication 
problem according to both models here considered. The conveyance model involves 
practitioners adopting the same attitude towards a performance. In contrast, the 
cooperative model allows for different attitudes, so long as they are responsive to 
those of others. Unfortunately, the ability made explicit by de re ascription involves 
neither. To put the problem picturesquely, and adapting Brandom’s own image, it is 
not that the dancers are making different movements, but that they are not dancing 
together; they are dancing alongside each other but not with each other. 
 
To make a more general point in closing, it is not at all clear that one commits oneself 
to any particular model of communication simply in virtue of holding that a theory of 
meaning must allow for such seeming platitudes as that it is possible for two speakers 
to understand an utterance in the same way, to say the same thing, and not always to 
talk past one another. Both the cooperative model and the conveyance model are 
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supposed to capture these platitudes and, I argued, Brandom’s version of IRS is 
therefore incompatible with them. 
 
7 Analyticity 
A proponent of IRS needs a story that avoids severing the link between meaning and 
understanding, but without relativising the former to individual understanding to such 
an extent that shared meaning (and hence communication) is impossible. My 
suggestion is that the holism be moderated. If an IRS of the kind Brandom outlines is 
to succeed, certain inferential relations must be privileged as determinative of the 
meaning or content of the relevant expression or utterance, and others treated as non-
determinative. That is, some inferences must be viewed as analytic. This would 
provide something constant between contexts, an invariant meaning that all 
practitioners could (in principle) grasp, irrespective of their different beliefs. 
 
Note that, in examining Brandom’s version of IRS, a pattern has emerged. 
Repeatedly, his appeal to the apparatus of de re ascription has not provided a genuine 
account of meaning or content that different speakers can grasp irrespective of 
differences in background beliefs. At best, the analysis of de re ascription appears to 
provide an explanation of how an ascriber can interpret another’s claim according to 
her own perspective and hence from outside her target’s, whereas what is required is 
an explanation of how a shared perspective on a person’s words is possible. 
Distinguishing certain inferential transitions as analytic provides precisely that. 
 
No doubt many philosophers would take the need to introduce an analytic/synthetic 
distinction to be reason to reject IRS altogether. As stated from the outset, while I am 
confident that a principled version of such a distinction can be drawn, I shall not argue 
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for that here. What matters for present purposes is that Brandom’s novel alternative to 
that strategy is unsuccessful and so, if one is sympathetic to IRS, a reassessment of 
the arguments against the notion of analyticity is called for.
26
 
 
References 
Beaney, M., ed. 1997. The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Block, N. 1995. “An Argument for Holism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
95: 151-69. 
Boghossian, P. 1993. “Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake?” 
Mind and Language 8: 27-40. 
--- 1994. “Inferential Role Semantics and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” 
Philosophical Studies 73: 109-122. 
--- 1997. “Analyticity.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, ed. B. Hale 
and C. Wright. Oxford: Blackwell. 
--- 2003. “Epistemic Analyticity: A Defence.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 66: 15-
35. 
Brandom, R. 1994. Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
--- 2000a. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
--- 2000b. “Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts: Reply to Habermas.” European 
Journal of Philosophy 8: 356-374. 
Fodor, J. and Lepore, E. 1991. “Why Meaning (Probably) isn’t Conceptual Role.” 
Mind and Language 6: 329-43. 
--- 1992. Holism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
  30 
--- 2001. ‘Brandom’s Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism.’ Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 68: 465-482. 
Frege, G. 1892. “On Sinn and Bedeutung.” Reprinted in Beaney, 1997. 
Glock, H-J. 2003. Quine and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Reality. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Grice, P. and Strawson, P. 1956. “In Defense of Dogma.” Reprinted in Grice, 1989. 
Harman, G. 1993. “Meaning Holism Defended.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 46: 
163-71. 
Hattiangadi, A. 2003. “Making it Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following.” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 66: 419-431. 
Horwich, P. 1992. “Quine versus Chomsky on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 95-108. 
--- 1998. Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
--- 2005. Reflections on Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Laurier, D. 2005. “Pragmatics, Pittsburgh Style.” Pragmatics and Cognition 13: 141-
160. 
Lepore, E. 1994. “Conceptual Role Semantics.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Mind, ed. S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lycan, W. G. 2000. Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge. 
McCullagh, M. 2005. “Motivating Inferentialism.” Southwest Philosophy Review 21: 
77-84. 
McDowell, J. 2005. “Motivating Inferentialism.” Pragmatics and Cognition 13: 121-
140. 
  31 
Peacocke, C. 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
--- 1997. “Holism.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, ed. B. Hale and 
C. Wright. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Putnam, H. 1991. Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Quine, W. V. O. 1951. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” Reprinted in Quine 1980. 
--- 1980. From a Logical Point of View, 2
nd
 ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Whiting, D. 2006a. “Conceptual Role Semantics.” In The Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. J. Fieser and B. Dowden. http://www.iep.utm.edu/ 
--- 2006b. “Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom’s Theory of Meaning” 
Acta Analytica 21: 3-22. 
--- 2007. “Fregean Sense and Anti-Individualism.” Philosophical Books 48: 233-240. 
  32 
Notes 
 
1
 For arguments in support of IRS, see Brandom, 1994, chs. 1-3; Horwich, 1998, chs. 
1-2; and Whiting, 2006a. For a critical response to Brandom’s arguments, see 
McCullagh, 2005; McDowell, 2005. Throughout this paper, I shall use the following 
abbreviations for Brandom’s texts: MIE – Making it Explicit; AR – Articulating 
Reasons. 
2
 Some proponents of IRS might object to marking the distinction with the term 
‘analytic’, since it is associated with putatively suspect notions such as true in virtue 
of meaning or knowable a priori. However, I intend it only as a label for the 
privileged meaning-constituting inferential transitions, and do not assume in advance 
that it carries any other commitments. 
3
 There is a substantial amount of interdependency among the many issues Brandom 
investigates. Specifically, Brandom’s explanations of the possibility of 
communication, de re and de dicto ascriptions, the objectivity of semantic norms, the 
possession of empirical content, semantic externalism, the nature of representation, 
and his dissolution of Kripkean meaning-scepticism all occur simultaneously! 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper I shall single out certain topics for 
independent discussion, even if full assessment of Brandom’s views eventually 
requires attending to the others. For discussion of remaining topics, see Laurier, 2005 
and Hattiangadi, 2003. Laurier questions whether the appeal to de re ascription 
affords an explanation of the objectivity of semantic norms, while Hattiangadi 
disputes Brandom’s claim to have avoided the familiar Kripkean rule-following 
problems. 
4
 For a start, see Boghossian, 1997; 2003; Glock, 2003, ch. 3; Grice and Strawson, 
1956; Horwich, 1998. Interestingly, Brandom holds that Quine’s critique of 
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analyticity is ‘hardly decisive’ (MIE, 484). For a critical discussion of holism in 
general, see Peacocke, 1997. 
5
 Brandom views the notion of linguistic meaning as derivative from that of 
propositional content: ‘it is not tokens but tokenings that are in the first instance 
considered as contentful. Sign-designs, the linguistic vehicles of content, are 
meaningful only at one remove, in virtue of their involvement in linguistic practices 
that express intentional states and attitudes’ (MIE, 664m10). 
6
 Cf. ‘[T]he inferential proprieties of inference that from the point of view of semantic 
theory are treated as primitive can be explained in the pragmatic theory as implicit in 
discursive practice.’ (MIE, 133; cf. 190) Also: ‘semantic primitives are themselves 
explained in terms of a prior pragmatics, which in turn appeals to normative 
primitives’ (MIE, 681n6). For critical discussion of this reductionist aspect of 
Brandom’s account, see Whiting, 2006b. 
7
 Cf. ‘Content is understood in terms of proprieties of inferences, and those are 
understood in terms of the norm-instituting attitudes of taking or treating moves as 
appropriate or inappropriate in practice […] In this way, a suitable pragmatic theory 
can ground an inferential semantic theory.’ (MIE, 134) 
8
 Cf. ‘[H]olistic conceptual role approaches to semantics potentially face problems 
concerning […] the possibility of communication between individuals who endorse 
different claims and inferences.’ (AR, 29)
 
Also: ‘an inferential conception of concepts 
raises prima facie difficulties for understanding what is involved in communication’ 
(MIE, 633). 
9
 Cf. ‘The underlying point is that what a given endorsement of a claim commits one 
to, is entitled by, and is incompatible with depends on what else one is committed to, 
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on what collateral information is available as auxiliary hypotheses for the inferences 
in question.’ (MIE, 477; cf. 590-1) 
10
 It might be thought that this problem could be avoided if one recognises that 
inferential profiles are communal. So long as different interlocutors are suitably 
related (say, deferentially) then their claims possess the same content. First, however, 
even if this suggestion resolves the communication issue, the associated problem of 
constancy would remain, because the communal profile would constantly change. 
Second, the communication problem only resurfaces as that of how groups 
communicate. 
11
 Fodor and Lepore mention that Brandom’s IRS faces the communication problem 
(2001, 469n5) but wrongly claim that he has ‘little to say’ about it. Although they 
critically discuss his views on de re ascription (477-8), Fodor and Lepore overlook 
Brandom’s linking of the two issues. 
12
 This problem is aggravated by Brandom’s endorsement of a paratactic analysis of 
ascriptional locutions. For example, Brandom parses ‘Galileo said that the earth 
moves’ as follows (MIE, 538): 
Galileo said (something that in his mouth then committed him to what an assertional 
utterance of this in my mouth now would commit me to): The earth moves. 
This makes vivid the respect in which making an ascription requires that the ascriber 
is able to undertake the same commitments as her target. And it seems that, given 
their differing perspectives, this is never the case. Nothing ‘in my mouth’ could have 
the same significance as something in Galileo’s, if global holism is true. 
13
 This needs to be qualified as involving suitable shifts of indexical expressions and 
language (for cases where the target does not speak the language of the ascription) 
(AR, 218n8; MIE, 544). 
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14
 Cf. ‘Since the same words in the ascriber’s mouth often do not express the same 
claim that they would in the mouth of the one to whom a claim is ascribed, the content 
specifications must take account of the difference in discursive perspective between 
the ascriber and the target of the ascription. Claims must often be differently 
expressed from the two points of view.’ (MIE, 589-90) 
15
 Cf. ‘The difference is just whether the expressive commitment, to a particular form 
of words being a way of expressing the commitment in question, is attributed along 
with the doxastic commitment being ascribed or undertaken along with the 
ascriptional commitment itself.’ (MIE, 545) 
16
 Cf. ‘Unless one has the substitutional interpretive capacity, which is expressed 
explicitly in de re specifications of the contents of ascribed commitments, one would 
not be able to understand what others are saying.’ (MIE, 513) 
17
 Nothing that follows is intended as an objection to Brandom’s account of the role of 
ascriptional locutions as such, which strikes me as very much along the right lines, but 
only to whether an appeal to that role can address the problems holism raises for IRS. 
18
 One might worry that the objections that follow rest upon a suspect view of 
communication. In §6, I shall address this concern at length in the light of the 
amassed criticisms of Brandom’s account. 
19
 One might think that a wholly de re ascription could be parsed in the following 
way: 
(5’) Sophie claims, of the claim that the vehicle parked in the garage ran 
over the cat, that it is a fact. 
First, however, one might note in passing an oddity in the suggestion that 
understanding another’s utterance requires implicit or explicit mastery of semantic 
notions such as claim or fact. Second, and crucially, Brandom views facts as true 
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claims, and so the locution ‘is a fact’ as equivalent to ‘is true’ (MIE, 327ff). 
Moreover, he offers a prosententialist account, according to which sentences of the 
form ‘p is true’ (and likewise ‘p is a fact’) are prosentences whose significance or 
content is determined by a class of admissible sentential substituends, perhaps the 
tokened sentence the prosentence contains (MIE, 301ff). Hence, the significance of 
the outstanding de dicto component of (5’), namely ‘it is a fact’, depends on which 
substitutional commitments one takes to be correct, namely whichever one takes to 
govern ‘The vehicle parked in the garage ran over the cat’. Insofar as ascriber and 
target will differ over which such commitments are appropriate, it remains the case 
that their understanding of the claim will differ. (Should this response not prove 
adequate, the objections of the preceding and subsequent sub-sections remain.) 
20
 For Brandom’s analysis of demonstratives, with which this objection is consonant, 
see MIE, 459ff. 
21
 One might think that communication or shared understanding only requires that a 
term has the same meaning for two people, whether or not both take it to have that 
meaning. Note, however, that in the first instance Brandom explains the inferential 
significance of a claim in terms of what practitioners take it to be, and it is by appeal 
to de re ascription that he accounts for its objective significance. Although examining 
in detail this aspect of Brandom’s theory is beyond the scope of this paper (see 
Laurier, 2005), the problem, again, is that the ability made explicit by de re ascription 
is at best an ability to ascribe to a claim the objective significance a speaker takes it to 
have, not the objective significance it does have (see §5). 
Aside from the details of Brandom’s IRS, it seems counterintuitive to hold that 
mutual understanding involves no responsiveness to one’s interlocutors’ attitudes. 
Moreover, insofar as the above account distances meaning from practitioners’ 
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attitudes, it undermines a central motivation for IRS, which promises precisely to 
account for the cognitive significance of what terms express (see, again, §5). Finally, 
on this conception the communication problem does not seem to arise and the appeal 
to de re ascription is otiose. That speakers differ in the significance they take a claim 
to have, given their different beliefs, does not show that they do not communicate, so 
long as that claim has a certain significance for both (in virtue perhaps of their 
combined doxastic profiles, or how things stand in the world). This paper takes for 
granted the communication problem and aims to address the question of whether 
appealing to de re ascription can solve it. This seems legitimate, even if the issue does 
not arise according to the alternative model of communication sketched above. I shall 
return to discuss models of communication in §6. 
22
 What follows is not intended as an argument against externalism per se, but only 
Brandom’s particular variant of it and its efficacy in resolving the communication 
issue. 
23
 The extent to which externalism and Fregeanism, which involves a fine-grained 
individuation of content, are compatible is a thorny issue. For some discussion, see 
Whiting, 2007. 
24
 Lepore (1994, 197-8), Lycan (2000, 93) and Putnam (1991, 46ff) all note a prima 
facie incompatibility between IRS – according to which meaning is had in virtue of 
word-word relations – and externalism – according to which meaning is had in virtue 
of word-world relations. 
25
 On Brandom’s account, it is supposed to be possible for speakers to ‘use others’ 
judgements as reasons’, that is, ‘for the claims undertaken by one interlocutor to 
become available to others (who attribute them) as premises and conclusions’ (MIE, 
474-5). 
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